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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Ryan Dean Bevard appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury
verdict finding him guilty of forgery. On appeal, Bevard claims the district court
abused its discretion when it permitted evidence of his prior convictions to be
admitted as impeachment evidence pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 609.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Bevard asked Terry Neumann, a cashier working in the electronics section
of Wal-Mart, if he could look at a Bluetooth speaker. (11/10/15 Tr., p. 139, L. 17
– p. 143, L. 15.) The Bluetooth speaker was locked in a glass case. (Id.) Ms.
Neumann got the Bluetooth speaker out of the glass case and Bevard told Ms.
Neumann he would like to buy it. (11/10/15 Tr., p. 143, L. 11 – p. 144, L. 15.)
The Bluetooth speaker cost more than $180 and was the most expensive
speaker that Wal-Mart sold. (11/10/15 Tr., p. 143, L. 25 – p. 144, L. 21.) Bevard
handed Ms. Neumann four $50 bills to pay for the Bluetooth speaker. (11/10/15
Tr., p. 144, L. 22 – p. 145, L. 16.) The four $50 bills did not feel right to Ms.
Neumann. (11/10/15 Tr., p. 145, L. 17 – p. 146, L. 12.) The bills felt like paper.
(Id.)
Ms. Neumann left Bevard at the register and went to find a manager and
get a “money pen” to check the bills. (11/10/15 Tr., p. 146, Ls. 5-19.) Ms.
Neumann also noticed that the ink on the bills was not the right color, the serial
numbers were all the same, the pictures were upside down, and there was no
water mark on the bills.

(11/10/15 Tr., p. 146, L. 5 – p. 148, L. 19.)
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Ms.

Neumann’s manager contacted Wal-Mart loss prevention. (11/10/15 Tr., p. 148,
L. 24 – p. 149, L. 7.) By the time Ms. Neumann got back to the register, about
four and half minutes later, Bevard was gone. (11/10/15 Tr., p. 149, L. 8 – p.
1
151, L. 8; see also Ex. 1 at 2:40:50 – 2:45:18 .)

When Bevard left the register, he went directly towards the exit and left
the Wal-Mart. (11/10/15 Tr., p. 182, Ls. 7-18.) At no time did Bevard come back
asking for his four $50 bills. (Id.) Wal-Mart loss prevention followed Bevard out
to his vehicle and obtained his license plate number. (11/10/15 Tr., p. 182, L. 19
– p. 183, L. 2.)
After Bevard drove away from the Wal-Mart, the police started following
him. (11/10/15 Tr., p. 238, Ls. 13-19.) The police had their overhead lights on
and were trying to pull Bevard over, but Bevard refused to pull over. (11/10/15
Tr., p. 251, Ls. 16-20; 11/13/15 Tr., p. 298, L. 15 – p. 299, L. 20.) While the
police were following him, Bevard called 911 and falsely reported a shooting.
(11/10/15 Tr., p. 198, L. 15 – p. 201, L. 11, p. 238, L. 24 – p. 239, L. 3.) Bevard
hoped the false report to 911 would redirect the officers who were trying to pull
him over. (11/13/15 Tr., p. 299, L. 21 – p. 300, L. 10.) Eventually the police had
to rear-end Bevard’s car to get him to stop. (11/10/15 Tr., p. 253, Ls. 2-17.)
The state charged Bevard with forgery and the following misdemeanors:
making a false 911 report, possession of drug paraphernalia, attempting to elude
a police officer and driving without privileges. (R., pp. 27-29.) The state also
filed a persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp. 45-46.)
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Exhibit 1 is a Wal-Mart surveillance video. The times are approximate.
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Prior to trial, the state filed a notice of intent to impeach Bevard pursuant
to Idaho Rule of Evidence 609 if he testified. (R., pp. 47-48.) Specifically, the
state sought to impeach Bevard based upon his 2009 burglary conviction and
2008 convictions for grand theft and burglary. (Id.)
On the first day of trial, Bevard pled guilty to all the misdemeanor charges.
(R., pp. 56, 59, 68; 11/10/15 Tr., p. 8, L. 1 – p. 12, L. 19.)

The jury trial

proceeded on the felony forgery charge. (R., pp. 59-67, 77-85.) Near the end of
the state’s case, Bevard indicated he intended to testify. (11/10/15 Tr., p. 255,
Ls. 7-12.) The district court ruled on the Idaho Rule of Evidence 609 issue.
THE COURT: We did address before the 609 issue. I do
believe that in order for the jury to be able to fairly evaluate the
credibility of the defendant if he does testify, given the prior
convictions as I recall, it was like grand theft.
MS. DUGGAN: And burglary.
THE COURT: Burglary. Those are Tier II crimes, as I
indicated I think at the time of the pretrial or status. The fact of
those convictions would be admissible under Rule 609. I’ve
considered the prejudicial effect and I don’t believe the prejudicial
effect outweighs the probative value of those prior convictions
should the defendant testify.
I believe the state should also be entitled to, and I will allow
them to elicit what the conviction was for. That will eliminate the
jury from speculating about what that might have been, as well as
to allow them to properly asses the credibility of the defendant. I
understand the defense’s point that they would prefer that the
nature of those not be admitted, but I believe that the nature is
relevant and I don’t believe that the nature in any way is too unfairly
prejudicial. I don’t think they are close enough of the same crime,
so to speak, that is charged in this case to make it unfair or overly
prejudicial to allow that. That’s kind of where we’re at with that. All
right? Anything else?
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(11/10/15 Tr., p. 256, L. 5 – p. 257, L. 6.) The district court explained that the
central question was whether the “crimes were so close in nature I thought it
would be too much of a danger of the jury treating it at [sic] propensity evidence.”
(11/10/15 Tr., p. 257, Ls. 10-19.) The district court invited defense counsel to
submit anything that might change the decision. (11/10/15 Tr., p. 256, L. 11 – p.
257, L. 19.)
Bevard moved the district court to reconsider its ruling. (R., pp. 70-73.)
The state filed a response to Bevard’s motion to reconsider. (R., pp. 74-76.)
The district court heard Bevard’s motion to reconsider. (11/13/15 Tr., p. 260, L.
23 – p. 261, L. 9.) The district court determined that the “probative value [of the
prior conviction evidence] is not outweighed by the prejudicial effect, but it seems
to me that the probative value of it is best and perhaps only judged in light of
understanding what the nature of it is.” (11/13/15 Tr., p. 263, L. 16 – p. 266, L. 2,
p. 270, L. 10 – p. 275, L. 3.) The district court considered the factors outlined in
State v. Rodgers, 119 Idaho 1066, 812 P.2d 1227 (Ct. App. 1990), review
granted on other grounds, State v. Rodgers, 119 Idaho 1047, 812 P.2d 1208
(1991). (11/13/15 Tr., p. 271, L. 24 – p. 274, L. 25.) The district court concluded
its analysis by stating:
Having weighed those considerations, the prejudicial versus the
probative value, having considered those factors, how to weigh it,
how to view it from the Rodger’s [sic] case, I think that the probative
value of the nature of the prior convictions is not outweighed by the
potential for prejudice. And so I’m going to allow the state to
reference those.
(11/13/15 Tr., p. 274, Ls. 19-25.)
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Bevard testified. (11/13/15 Tr., p. 292, L. 21 – p. 352, L. 23.) Bevard
claimed the reason he refused to pull over for the police was because he was
driving without a license and had a warrant out for his arrest. (11/13/15 Tr., p.
298, L. 15 – p. 299, L. 20.) He also admitted to making a false 911 report in an
effort to redirect the officers who were trying to pull him over. (11/13/15 Tr., p.
299, L. 21 – p. 299, L. 21 – p. 300, L. 10, p. 336, L. 17 – p. 337, L. 2.) Bevard
denied he knowingly passed fake $50 bills. (11/13/15 Tr., p. 301, Ls. 1-3.)
On direct examination, Bevard testified he was previously convicted for
burglary and grand theft. (11/13/15 Tr., p. 301, L. 4 – p. 302, L. 10.)
You obviously have made reference to going back to jail.
Q.
You have in your past two prior felony convictions; is that correct?
A.

Yes, I do.

Q.

And those two felonies, one is for burglary; is that correct?

A.

Yes, sir, it is.

Q.

And the other one is for grand theft; is that correct?

A.

Yes, it is.

(11/13/15 Tr., p. 301, Ls. 4-13.) Bevard then explained that those convictions
occurred about seven years prior when he was 17 and 18 years old. (11/13/15
Tr., p. 301, L. 14 – p. 302, L. 10.) No further testimony was provided regarding
Bevard’s prior convictions. As part of the closing instructions, the district court
instructed the jury that evidence of Bevard’s prior convictions could be
considered “only as it may affect” Bevard’s credibility as a witness. (11/13/15
Tr., p. 376, Ls. 2-7.)
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Bevard admitted that approximately two weeks before the charged
offense he had returned another speaker to Wal-Mart for cash. (11/13/15 Tr., p.
342, L. 13 – p. 343, L. 6.) Bevard conceded that buying a speaker for cash and
then returning it to Wal-Mart for cash would be a good way to launder money.
(11/13/15 Tr., p. 343, Ls. 11-20.) Bevard admitted that he walked away from the
$200, and if the money was real he would have wanted it back. (11/13/15 Tr., p.
347, L. 11 – p. 348, L. 7.)

Bevard also testified that he lied to the police.

(11/13/15 Tr., p. 327, L. 17 – p. 328, L. 3.)
The jury found Bevard guilty of forgery. (R., p. 114; 11/13/15 Tr., p. 403,
L. 23 – p. 404, L. 11.) Bevard entered a guilty plea to the persistent violator
enhancement. (R., p. 85; 11/13/15 Tr., p. 405, L. 15 – p. 408, L. 9.) The district
court entered judgment and sentenced Bevard to fifteen years with four years
fixed. (R., pp. 116-120.) Bevard timely appealed. (R., pp. 121-124.)
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ISSUE
Bevard states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err in concluding the State could impeach Mr.
Bevard with both the fact and nature of his prior felony convictions
pursuant to IRE 609?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 5.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Bevard failed to show the district court abused its discretion when it
determined that the probative value of the nature of Bevard’s prior convictions
outweighed its prejudicial effect and, therefore, both the fact and the nature of
the prior convictions were admissible pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 609?
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ARGUMENT
Bevard Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It
Determined The Probative Value Of Bevard’s Prior Convictions Outweighed
Their Prejudicial Effect Under Rule Of Evidence 609
A.

Introduction
On appeal, Bevard does not challenge the relevancy of his prior

convictions, but only claims the district court abused its discretion when it
concluded the probative value of the nature of his prior convictions outweighed
their prejudicial effect. (See Appellant’s brief, p. 7.) Bevard has failed to show
the district court abused its discretion.

The district court properly admitted

evidence of the nature of Bevard’s prior convictions for burglary and grand theft
for impeachment purposes under Idaho Rule of Evidence 609.
B.

Standard Of Review
Under Idaho Rule of Evidence 609(a) the trial court must apply a two-

prong test to determine whether evidence of the prior conviction should be
admitted: (1) the trial court must determine whether the fact or nature of the
conviction is relevant to the witness’ credibility; and (2) if so, the trial court
determines whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial
effect. State v. Thompson, 132 Idaho 628, 630, 977 P.2d 890, 892 (1999) (citing
State v. Bush, 131 Idaho 22, 30, 951 P.2d 1249, 1257 (1997)).
When the appellate court reviews the trial court’s decision as to the first
prong, concerning relevance, the standard of review is de novo. Id. (citing Bush,
131 Idaho 22, 30, 951 P.2d 1249, 1257; State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758,
766, 864 P.2d 596, 604 (1993)). The appellate court reviews the trial court’s
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decision as to the second prong, concerning whether the probative value of the
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect, for an abuse of discretion. Id. (citing
Bush, 131 Idaho at 31, 951 P.2d at 1258).
When reviewing an exercise of discretion on appeal, the appellate court
considers: (1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer bounds of such discretion
and consistently with legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3)
whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Id. (citing Bush,
131 Idaho at 31, 951 P.2d at 1258; State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768
P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989)).
C.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Determined The
Probative Value Of The Nature Of Bevard’s Prior Convictions Did Not
Outweigh Their Prejudicial Effect
Prior to trial, the state gave notice that it intended to impeach Bevard,

pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 609, based upon his 2009 burglary
conviction and 2008 convictions for grand theft and burglary. (R., pp. 47-48.)
The district court ruled that the convictions were relevant and that the prejudicial
effect did not outweigh the probative value of those prior convictions. (11/10/15
Tr., p. 256, L. 5 – p. 257, L. 6.) Further, the district court held that the nature of
the convictions was relevant and not unfairly prejudicial. (Id.) The district court
invited Bevard to file a motion to reconsider. (11/10/15 Tr., p. 257, Ls. 7-19.)
Bevard moved the district court to reconsider its ruling. (R., pp. 70-73.) On
reconsideration the district court again determined the nature of Bevard’s prior
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convictions was admissible for impeachment under Rule 609. (11/13/15 Tr., p.
271, L. 24 – p. 274, L. 25.)
On direct examination, Bevard testified he was previously convicted for
burglary and grand theft. (11/13/15 Tr., p. 301, L. 4 – p. 302, L. 10.) The district
court gave a limiting instruction regarding Bevard’s prior convictions. (11/13/15
Tr., p. 376, Ls. 2-7.)
Evidence of defendant’s previous conviction of an offense may be
considered by you only as it may affect the defendant’s believability
as a witness. You must not consider it as evidence of the
defendant’s guilt of the offense charged in this case.
(Id.)
On appeal, Bevard does not challenge the district court’s determination
that Bevard’s convictions met the relevancy prong.2

“Mr. Bevard does not

challenge the district court’s determination that the fact of his prior burglary and
grand theft convictions was relevant to his credibility. Instead he contends the
district court erred in concluding the probative value of the nature of his prior
convictions outweighed their prejudicial impact.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 7.) Bevard
argues that “[t]he district court did not reach its decision by an exercise of
reason.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 9.) Bevard is incorrect.

2

Regarding the first prong of the analysis, the district court determined that
Bevard’s prior felony convictions for burglary and grand theft were relevant, in
part, because they were “Tier II” crimes. (11/10/15 Tr., p. 256, L. 5 – p. 257, L.
6.) Tier II (also known as “category two”) crimes, like robbery, larceny or burglary
can be relevant to a witness’s credibility. See State v. Ybarra, 102 Idaho 573,
581, 634 P.2d 435, 443 (1981) (“We agree with those courts which hold that a
crime such as burglary can be relevant to credibility, and we hold that there was
no error in the court's decision to allow use of the prior felony conviction to
impeach Ybarra.”).
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Idaho Rule of Evidence 609(a) permits the use of both the fact and nature
of a witness’s prior felony conviction for impeachment, if the court determines
they are relevant to the witness’s credibility and the probative value of the
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect:
(a) General Rule. For the purposes of attacking a witness's
character for truthfulness, evidence of the fact that the witness has
been convicted of a felony and the nature of the felony shall be
admitted if elicited from the witness or established by public record,
but only if the court determines in a hearing outside the presence of
the jury that the fact of the prior conviction or the nature of the prior
conviction, or both, are relevant to the witness's character for
truthfulness and that the probative value of admitting this evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the party offering the witness. If
the evidence of the fact of a prior felony conviction, but not the
nature of the conviction, is admitted for the purpose of
impeachment of a party to the action or proceeding, the party shall
have the option to present evidence of the nature of the conviction,
but evidence of the circumstances of the conviction shall not be
admissible.
I.R.E. 609(a).
There are seven factors a court may consider in weighing the probative
value of the defendant’s prior conviction against its prejudicial impact. See State
v. Rodgers, 119 Idaho 1066, 812 P.2d 1227 (Ct. App. 1990), review granted on
other grounds, State v. Rodgers, 119 Idaho 1047, 812 P.2d 1208 (1991);
Thompson, 132 Idaho at 634, 977 P.2d at 895.
(1) the impeachment value of the prior crime, (2) the remoteness of
the prior conviction, (3) the witness’s criminal history, (4) the
similarity between the past crime and the crime charged, (5) the
importance of the witness’s testimony, (6) the centrality of the
credibility issue, and (7) the nature and extent of the witness’
criminal record as a whole.
Rodgers, 119 Idaho at 1073, 812 P.2d at 1234 (parenthetical numbering added).
The district court considered these Rogers factors. (11/13/15 Tr., p. 271, L. 24 –
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p. 274, L. 25.)

The district court explicitly considered these factors in its

admissibility determination, explaining:
I look at what courts have – at least what lens they’ve looked
at this issue through, and I look [at] State v. Rodgers case, 119
Idaho, 1066, (1990) and affirmed by the Supreme Court in ’91
case. The court basically identified seven items that should be
looked at: One is the impeachment value of the prior crime, the
remoteness of the prior conviction, the witness’ criminal history, the
similarity between the the [sic] past crime and the crime charged,
the importance of the witness’s testimony, the centrality of the
credibility issue, and the nature and extent of the witness’ criminal
record as a whole in viewing these things.
I’ve certainly looked at all of those factors and considered all
of those factors. To me in some respect what is important here are
a couple of things in making this decision: The closeness of the
prior felony convictions to this crime in terms of the type of crime,
number one; and, number two, the centrality of the credibility issue.
(11/13/15 Tr., p. 271, L. 24 – p. 272, L. 17.) The district court went on to find
that Bevard’s credibility was central to the case and that burglary and grand theft
are different crimes than forgery. (11/13/15 Tr., p. 272, L. 17 – p. 273, L. 24.)
Bevard also claims the district court abused its discretion because the
courts in Thompson and Rodgers permitted the fact of defendant’s prior
conviction to be used, but not the nature of those prior convictions.

(See

Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-9 (citing Rodgers and Thompson, supra). These cases
are readily distinguishable.

In Rodgers, the defendant had previously been

convicted of second degree murder and was on trial for first degree murder.
Rodgers, 119 Idaho at 1071-1072, 812 P.2d 1232-1233.

In Thompson, the

defendant had previously been convicted of lewd and lascivious conduct and
was on trial for sexual battery of a minor child sixteen or seventeen years of age.
Thompson, 132 Idaho at 629-630, 977 P.2d at 891-892. In both cases the prior
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crime was closely related to the current charge, so it made sense that the court
would not introduce the nature of the prior conviction in order to prevent
propensity problems. Here, as the district court found, forgery is a different crime
than burglary or grand theft.

Knowingly passing counterfeit $50 bills is

substantially different than either entering a building with the intent to steal or
stealing goods in excess of $1,000.
Bevard also argues, “[t]he district court did not appear to recognize that it
had discretion to withhold from the jury the nature of Mr. Bevard’s prior
convictions.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 11.) Bevard’s argument is contrary to the
record, which shows the district court separately analyzed both whether to admit
the fact of the felony convictions and whether to admit the nature of the
convictions. (See 11/10/15 Tr., p. 256, L. 11 – p. 257, L. 6.) On reconsideration
the district court also explicitly analyzed under Rule 609 whether it should allow
the nature of the prior convictions. (11/13/15 Tr., p. 270, L. 10 – p. 274, L. 25.)
Therefore, contrary to Bevard’s argument on appeal, the district court did
recognize that it had discretion to withhold from the jury the nature of Bevard’s
prior convictions.

Bevard has failed to show the district court abused its

discretion.
D.

Even If The District Court Abused Its Discretion, The Error Was Harmless
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined the

probative value of the nature Bevard’s prior convictions outweighed any
prejudicial effect. However, even if the district court abused its discretion, the
error was harmless.

“Where a defendant alleges error at trial that he
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contemporaneously objected to, this Court reviews the error on appeal under the
harmless error test.” State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 600-01, 301 P.3d 242,
258-259 (2013) (citation omitted). “[T]he error is harmless if the Court finds that
the result would be the same without the error.” Id. at 598, 301 P.3d at 256
(citation omitted).
On direct examination, Bevard testified he was previously convicted for
burglary and grand theft. (11/13/15 Tr., p. 301, L. 4 – p. 302, L. 10.)
You obviously have made reference to going back to jail.
Q.
You have in your past two prior felony convictions; is that correct?
A.

Yes, I do.

Q.

And those two felonies, one is for burglary; is that correct?

A.

Yes, sir, it is.

Q.

And the other one is for grand theft; is that correct?

A.

Yes, it is.

(11/13/15 Tr., p. 301, Ls. 4-13.)3

Bevard explained that those convictions

occurred about seven years prior when he was 17 and 18 years old. (11/13/15
Tr., p. 301, L. 14 – p. 302, L. 9.) No further testimony was provided regarding
Bevard’s prior convictions.
The result of the trial would have been the same had the district court
permitted the impeachment on the fact of Bevard’s prior convictions but not
allowed the nature of the prior convictions. Ms. Neumann testified that the four

3

According to the state’s motion, Bevard actually had three prior felony
convictions. (R., pp. 47-48.) However, the prosecutor did not challenge this
discrepancy in Bevard’s testimony.
14

$50 bills did not feel right. (11/10/15 Tr., p. 145, L. 17 – p. 146, L. 12.) She
testified the bills felt like paper. (Id.) The ink on the bills was also not the right
color, the serial numbers were all the same, the pictures were upside down, and
there was no water mark on the bills. (11/10/15 Tr., p. 146, L. 5 – p. 148, L. 19.)
Bevard’s behavior after Ms. Nuemann went to get a manager also supports the
jury’s verdict. Bevard left the register and walked directly towards the exit and
left the Wal-Mart. (11/10/15 Tr., p. 182, Ls. 7-18.) At no time did he come back
asking for his four $50 bills. (Id.) When he was pursued by the police, he made
a false report to 911 in an effort to redirect the officers who were trying to pull
him over. (11/13/15 Tr., p. – p. 299, L. 21 – p. 300, L. 10, p. 336, L. 17 – p. 337,
L. 2.) Further, the jurors were also specifically instructed that they could only
consider evidence of Bevard’s prior convictions as it related to his credibility and
not as evidence of his guilt. (11/13/15 Tr., p. 376, Ls. 2-7.) Regarding Bevard’s
credibly, he admitted that he lied to the police about having warrants and
admitted to making the false 911 report. (11/13/15 Tr., p. 327, Ls. 17-25, p. 334,
L. 24 – p. 335, L. 18.)

Bevard testified he lied to the police officer twice.

(11/13/15 Tr., p. 351, Ls. 14-16.) Even without the nature of the prior felony
convictions the result of the trial would have been the same.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment of the
district court.
DATED this 14th day of September 2016.
_/s/ Ted S/ Tollefson____
TED S. TOLLEFSON
Deputy Attorney General
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at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

__/s/ Ted S. Tollefson_____________
TED S. TOLLEFSON
Deputy Attorney General
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